Introduction

In any discipline polysyllabic terms roam the landscape often appearing like untamable beasts to the uninitiated. Theology is certainly not immune to this characterization. We find this to be true with the term theological prolegomena. What is it and to what does it refer? The first term, theological, is made up of the two Greek words, theos (God) and logos (word), and refers to the study of God. The second, prolegomena, is made up of two Greek words, pro (before) and legomena, the participle form of the word lego (I say). Hence prolegomena literally means "before words," or "sayings." Within the context of theology, then, theological prolegomena is the term that refers to "the introductory section of a treatise or system of thought in which basic principles and premises are enunciated." Stated simply, theological prolegomena is the section in a theological work where a theologian’s presuppositions are laid out. For example, What is theology? What is the relationship between God’s knowledge and our knowledge? How does human reason relate to theology? Now, theological prolegomena is something that we might take for granted because of the place in church history where we stand. Therefore, let us first conduct a brief reconnaissance of the history of the development of prolegomena. This will set the stage for an examination of what Francis Turretin writes on the subject.

History of the Development of Prolegomena

Early in church history theological works contained no specific section that explained a theologian’s presuppositions. In the Patristic Age (c. 100-600) when theologians expounded doctrine, they simply entered into their theological discourses without any consideration of what presuppositions they were bringing to the enterprise. Medieval theologians (c. 600-1500) received these doctrinal expositions from the church fathers and drew them together into collections of theological statements and definitions, typically called sententiae, or "sentences." It was with these bodies of collected doctrinal statements, or sentences, that medieval theologians began to realize that it was necessary and desirable to identify presuppositions and mark out methodology. For example, we see Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) address issues such as the necessity of theology, whether theology is speculative or practical, whether it is the same as wisdom, and whether God is its subject matter. It was during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that there was a flurry of development in the area of theological prolegomena. By the Reformation (1517-64), however, Protestant theologians were not interested in discussions about prolegomena, though we can glean what presuppositions are inherent in their theological thought. For example, we can glean Martin Luther’s (1483-1546) theological presuppositions in his famous statement from the Diet of Worms (1520):

"Unless I am convicted by Scripture and plain reason—I do not accept the authority of popes and councils, for they have contradicted each other—my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I cannot and I will not recant anything, for to go against conscience is neither right nor safe. God help me. Amen." 5

We can see that Luther presupposes the authority of Scripture, the use of reason to interpret Scripture, as well as the fallibility of all human authority demanding the submission of human reason to the authority of Scripture. 5 As the Reformation continued and polemics with Roman Catholics and Lutherans continued there was an increasing amount of attention paid to the need to identify presuppositions in theology.

We can see, for example, in the First Helvetic Confession (1536), written by Heinrich Bullinger (1504-75) and others, that presuppositional issues became a concern. They therefore explicitly address those issues raised in Martin Luther’s statement: the inspiration of Scripture, its proper interpretation, the authority of the church fathers, the role of church tradition, and the scope of Scripture. 7 This type of increased awareness for the need to address presuppositional issues can also be seen in the development of John Calvin’s (1509-64) Institutes of the Christian Religion. When he initially wrote his Institutes in 1536, it was little more than an exposition of major Protestant beliefs. By the 1559 edition, however, we see greater attention given to issues such as the twofold knowledge of God, or how we know God. 8 This trend continued beyond the Reformation and on into the period of Early Orthodoxy (1565-1630/40). 9

In the Early Orthodox period we see more direct
attention given to the need to address presuppositional issues not only in confessions of faith but also in theological works. We see an inchoate prolegomena in Zacharias Ursinus’ (1534-83) Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism, a compilation of lectures he delivered on the catechism published posthumously. Ursinus addresses issues such as, what is the doctrine of the church, how philosophy differs from theology, and the various methods of teaching and studying doctrine. For example, he identifies the three major methods of teaching theology. First, there is catechetical instruction which “comprises a brief summary and simple exposition of the principal doctrines of the Christian religion.” Second, is the loci communes, or common places method, which contains “a more lengthy explanation of every single point; and of difficult questions with their definitions, divisions, and arguments.” And, third, is the “careful and diligent reading of the Scriptures or sacred text.”10 The presuppositional issues that Ursinus raises, however, only scratch the surface when we compare them with the issues that were raised in the period of High Orthodoxy (1630/40-1700).11

When we come to the period of High Orthodoxy, the theological prolegomena of that time are arguably the most exhaustive and most finely tooled prolegomena in the history of theology.12 Reformed theologians returned to the theological prolegomena of the middle ages, particularly those written in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, for models on which they could base their own prolegomena.13 It is within this theological milieu that we come to Francis Turretin’s (1623-87) prolegomena. Though Turretin’s prolegomena resembles the medieval prolegomena of, say Aquinas, this does not mean that he simply copied his work. On the contrary, we see a very careful interaction with secular and sacred authors that lead Turretin to his conclusions. When we look at Turretin’s prolegomena, there are several major issues that he addresses: (1) What is theology and is it speculative or practical; (2) What is the relationship between God’s knowledge and our knowledge; and (3) How does human reason relate to theology?

What is Theology and is it Speculative or Practical?

Turretin begins his massive Institutes with an explanation of the term theology. He acknowledges the fact that the term is not explicitly found in Scripture but that the idea is certainly present. He argues that a basic definition is that it refers to the “words of God,” as the phrase is found in Romans 3:2.14 Turretin then goes on to trace the use of the word in antiquity by ancient philosophers and argues that just because the “heathen” misused the term is no reason not to use the term within a Christian context.15 He then goes on to trace its use in the history of Christian thought and makes reference to Aquinas’ definition of theology, “Theology is taught by God, teaches God and leads to him,” to which Turretin replies, “This nomenclature embraces the twofold principle of theology: one of being, which is God; the other of knowing, which is his word.”16 Turretin then traces the idea through Aristotle (384-322 bc), its use in the early church, and arrives at the conclusion that theology is “a system or body of doctrine concerning God and divine things revealed by him for his own glory and the salvation of men.”17 After defining the term, Turretin then turns his attention to the question of whether theology is speculative or practical.

On the surface, this question might not seem relevant especially given our current understanding of the term speculative. People frequently identify this term as one that conveys the idea of guess-work or something that is unproven. Within the history of theology, however, a “discipline is speculative or contemplative when its truths are grasped in and for themselves, when the knowledge it conveys is an end in itself.” On the other hand, “a discipline is practical when its knowledge does not end in itself but directs the knower toward an exercise or activity and thereby toward a goal beyond the discipline itself.”18 Now, at first glance we might be led to the conclusion that theology is a practical discipline because it directs a person towards the action of obedience and faith in God. Yet, it may surprise us that this is a view that Turretin rejects. Turretin writes that the Socinians, seventeenth-century rationalists, and Arminians, argue that “theology is so strictly practical that nothing in it is positively necessary to salvation, unless it is that which pertains to moral precepts and promises.”19 Turretin argues that because this turns the focus exclusively to morality, it therefore turns the focus of theology away from subjects like the Trinity or the incarnation. So where does Turretin land on this question?

This was a question that dates back to the middle ages to which some such as Peter Lombard (c. 1095-1169) thought it strictly theoretical, some such as John Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308) thought it strictly practical, others such as Bonaventure (1221-74) and Albert the Great (1193-1280) thought it was instead
of an entirely higher order because its ultimate goal was love, and still others such as Aquinas thought it was both practical and theoretical with an emphasis upon the theoretical. Aquinas, for example, writes that theology is "speculative rather than practical, because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts." Turretin, on the other hand, offers his own definition. Turretin writes: "We consider theology to be neither simply theoretical nor simply practical, but partly theoretical, partly practical, as that which at the same time connects the theory of the true with the practice of the good. Yet it is more practical than theoretical." Turretin goes on to explain in what ways theology is theoretical and practical, and he concludes

"that theology is more practical than speculative is evident from the ultimate end, which is practice. For although all mysteries are not regulative of operation, they are impulsive to operation. For there is none so theoretical and removed from practice that it does not incite to the love and worship of God. Nor is any theory saving which does not lead to practice."

We see, then, that Turretin does not think theology to be strictly practical, as with the Socinians and Arminians. This turns theology into mere moralism. On the other hand, he does not think that theology is purely theoretical, nor does he think its emphasis is upon the theoretical as Aquinas does. He believes that it is both theoretical and practical, but that the emphasis is upon the practical.

In fact, Turretin writes that "there is no mystery proposed to our contemplation as an object of faith which does not excite us to the worship of God."

All of this, of course, echoes that familiar first question of the Westminster Shorter Catechism (1647), "What is the chief end of man? Ans. Man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever." It is in this simple statement that we see Turretin's theoretical side of theology, "to enjoy God," and the practical side, "to glorify God," expressed so succinctly. Though, like Turretin, the Westminster divines emphasize man's primary vocation is to glorify God—"it is his chief end. We should not misunderstand Turretin, however, when he agrees with medieval theologians such as Aquinas that theology does have a theoretical or speculative aspect to it.

Unlike Aquinas, Turretin believes that the theoretical affirmations about God must be governed by the Word of God and not bare metaphysics or philosophy. Turretin writes that

"when God is set forth as the object of theology, he is not to be regarded simply as God in himself (for thus he is incomprehensible to us), but as revealed and as he has been pleased to manifest himself to us in his word, so that divine revelation is the formal relation which comes to be considered in this object. Now is he to be considered exclusively under the relation of deity (according to the opinion of Thomas Aquinas and many Scholastics after him, for in this manner the knowledge of him could not be saving but deadly to sinners, but as he is our God (i.e. covenanted in Christ as he has revealed himself to us in his word not only as the object of knowledge but also of worship. True religion (which theology teaches) consists of these two things."

What we see, then, is a careful balance between the theoretical, governed by the Word, and an emphasis upon the practical, the impetus to worship and love God, when it comes to defining the nature of theology. Now, what about the relationship between God's knowledge and our knowledge?

The Relationship Between God's Knowledge and Our Knowledge

A key presuppositional tenet of any theological system is the question of how God's knowledge relates to our knowledge of Him. Historically speaking, theologians have always recognized a difference between God's and man's knowledge. Recognizing this fact was not new to theological prolegomena, but has its roots in the Middle Ages.

Medieval theologians recognized that God is infinite, as is His knowledge, whereas man is finite and so is his knowledge. They used the term theologia in se, or theology in itself, to denote "theology known in and of itself to the divine mind." Only God's mind is capable of knowing the object of theology, God Himself, perfectly. Man's knowledge of God, on the other hand, is limited. Medieval theologians expressed this idea with a pair of terms that illustrate the limited nature of man's intellectual abilities. The first term is the theologia viatorum, or the theology of the pilgrims or wayfarers. In other words, as long as we pilgrim to the heavenly city, our knowledge is incomplete. Our theological knowledge will be completed, though never to the level of God's knowledge or theologia in se, when we reach our heavenly destination and receive the theologia beatorum, or the theology of the blessed. We see William of Ockham (1280-1349), for example, recognize this distinction when he writes: "I grant that anyone who
can have a concept of God like the concept had by one who is happy in heaven can infer the truths in question evidently. But a wayfarer cannot have such a concept naturally.\(^{29}\) He argues that the knowledge of those in heaven is complete in comparison to the knowledge of those still wayfaring to the heavenly city. Ockham supports his contention by appealing to the experience of the apostle Paul, who when he was raptured to heaven (2 Cor. 12:1ff) experienced *theologia beatorum* and he learned things that he did not know on earth as a pilgrim.\(^{29}\) Now, this difference between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge, though not expressed in the same nomenclature, was carried into the Reformation.

Reformed theologians such as Calvin recognized that God condescends to man’s level in order to communicate to him. God does not reveal knowledge at God’s comprehension level; He accommodates it to man’s limited understanding. For example, when Scripture speaks of God having hands, ears, eyes, and feet, Calvin explains that “who even of slight intelligence does not understand that, as nurses commonly do with infants, God is wont in a measure to ‘lisp’ in speaking to us? Thus such forms of speaking do not so much express clearly what God is like as accommodate the knowledge of him to our slight capacity. To do this he must descend far beneath his loftiness.”\(^{30}\)

Again, just as medieval theologians argued that God’s knowledge of Himself, *theologia in se*, is far greater than the knowledge of a wayfarer or a pilgrim, so Calvin recognizes that God “lips,” or “prattles” to man when He reveals truth to him.\(^{31}\)

Along this trajectory from the middle ages and through the Reformation Turretin recognizes this important difference between God’s and man’s knowledge. Turretin, however, uses the terms *archetypal* and *ectypal* theology to set the boundaries of man’s knowledge. Archetypal theology is “infinite and uncreated, which is God’s essential knowledge of himself (Mt. 11:27) in which he alone is at the same time the object known, the knowledge, and the knower.” This, of course, is synonymous with the medieval *theologia in se*, or God’s own knowledge. Ectypal theology, on the other hand, is that type of knowledge which God has deigned to reveal to us and is “finite and created, which is the image and etype of the infinite and archetypal.”\(^{32}\) This term is synonymous with the medieval idea of the theology of the pilgrim or wayfarer. Moreover, what Calvin states in word pictures, the idea of a prattling nurse maid, Turretin states in precise theological terminology rooted in the stream of medieval thought. This is an important distinction to note because it demonstrates that Turretin places specific limits on man’s ability to know God. Not only does God reveal man’s knowledge to him, but also this revelation is by no means comprehensive. This demonstrates that Turretin is no rationalist. This fact can be borne out with an examination of his views on the role of reason in theology.

**The Role of Reason in Theology**

Turretin asks the following question regarding the role of reason in theology: “Is human reason the principle and rule by which the doctrines of the Christian religion and theology (which are the objects of faith) ought to be measured?” He answers, “We deny.”\(^{33}\) Turretin goes on to define the nature of the question of the role of reason in theology and explains that “the question is whether [reason] is the first principle from which the doctrines of faith are proved; or the foundation upon which they are built.”\(^{34}\) Turretin then gives six reasons as to why human reason cannot be the foundation of theology:

1. The reason of an unregenerate man is blinded with respect to the law (Eph. 4:17, 18; Rom. 1:27; 28; 8:7).

2. The mysteries of the faith are beyond the sphere of reason to which the unregenerate man cannot rise . . .

3. Faith is not referred ultimately to reason, so that I ought to believe because I so understand and comprehend; but to the word because God so speaks in the Scriptures.

4. The Holy Spirit directs us to the word alone (Dt. 4:1; Is. 8:20; Jn. 5:39; 2 Tim. 3:15, 16; 2 Pet. 1:19).

5. If reason is the principle of faith, then first it would follow that all religion is natural and demonstrable by natural reason and natural light . . .

6. Reason cannot be the rule of religion; neither as corrupted because it is not only below faith, but also opposed to it (Rom. 8:7; 1 Cor. 2:14; Mt. 16:17); nor as sound because this is not found in corrupt man, nor in an uncontaminated man could it be the rule of supernatural mysteries. Nor now when it is corrected by the Spirit must it be judged according to itself, but according to the first principle which illuminated reason now admits (viz., the Scriptures).\(^{35}\)
Throughout these six reasons, Turretin explains why human reason is an unacceptable foundation for theology and draws the reader's attention to the Scriptures as the foundation of doctrine. This is especially evident with the phrase, “Nor now when [reason] is corrected by the Spirit must it be judged according to itself, but according to the first principle which illuminated reason now admits (viz., the Scriptures).”

Turretin and Reformed Orthodox theologians assigned reason an ancillary role in theology.36 Reason as we saw, is not the foundation for theology, but simply a tool at the disposal of the theologian. Turretin explains that in “matters of faith reason stands not only in the relation of an instrument by which, but also sometimes from a means and argument from, the theologian argues.”37 Turretin therefore uses reason to draw conclusions from Scripture, what Reformed theologians call a good and necessary consequence: “Thus reason enlightened by the Holy Spirit through the word is able to consider and to judge from the word (according to the rule of good and necessary consequence) how the parts of a doctrine cohere and what may or may not follow from them.”38 This, of course, echoes what had been in the stream of Reformed thought for quite sometime evidenced by its elevation to confessional status in the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647): “The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith, and life is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture” (1.6).

This practice, however, is one that Turretin bases upon Scripture itself and he cites, for example, Christ’s argument to prove the resurrection contra the Sadauces (Matt. 22:32).39 Turretin is careful to specify, however, that this does not place reason in authority over Scripture:

“Although we allow the judgment of discretion to reason enlightened by the Holy Spirit, we do not by this constitute ourselves the ultimate arbiters and judges in controversies of faith or take away from Scripture the supreme decisive judgment (for these are subordinate, not contrary). Reason in this sense always judges according to Scripture as the first and infallible standard.”40

Turretin repeatedly emphasizes the teaching of Scripture that human reason stands in a subordinate relation to revelation. In fact, it was many Reformed scholastic theologians like Turretin who battled the rationalism of Rene Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes, for example, writes in his Discourse on the Method:

“I took note that, while I wanted thus to think that everything was false, it necessarily had to be that I, who was thinking this, were something. And noticing that this truth—I think, therefore I am—was so firm and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were not capable of shaking it, I judged that I could accept it, without scruple, as the first principle of the philosophy that I was seeking.”41

Reformed scholastics like Turretin saw Descartes’ use of doubt as a foundation for knowledge, especially in theology, in conflict with the authority of Scripture. Cartesian philosophy elevated reason to a position of autonomy; this was unacceptable to Orthodox theologians and was therefore rejected.42 For this reason Turretin writes that theology “rules over philosophy, and this latter acts as a handmaid to and subserves the former.”43

Summary and Conclusion

Now, in this brief survey of the major tenets of Turretin’s prolegomena we see important presuppositions laid out at the beginning of his theological project. He defines theology and identifies it as both a theoretical and practical discipline with emphasis upon the practical. He recognizes that man’s theological knowledge is but a reflection of God’s own knowledge. Lastly, he ensures that human reason may be used as a helpful tool, but it must always be subject to the final authority of Scripture. He sets forth not only the ultimate end goal of theology, the love and worship of God, but he also recognizes the finitude of man. Because man is finite, he must bow before the knowledge of God and submit himself to His revealed Word. We see this wonderfully captured when Turretin writes in the preface of his Institutes: “Since I am a man (and I do not suppose that I am free from any human limitations), if anything would be said by me here that would correspond little with Scripture united with the rule of faith, not only do I want it to be unsaid, but even to be stricken out.”44

Though theologians had advocated similar principles for hundreds of years before Turretin in the Middle Ages and Reformation, he takes these important issues and sets them before the reader to ensure that the parameters of the theological task are set. Turretin does this by considering how other theologians, particularly medieval theologians,
answered these questions before him. He searched antiquity because, as he writes:

"Old is best here and that which goes back to earliest antiquity. It was discovered through much sad experience that they always dangerously go astray who spurn the well-known and well-worn paths in order to cut new ones which lead off as much as possible into the pathless heights and precipices." 45

Certainly this can inform and guide our own theological investigations and expositions. We should consider what issues must be raised and what presuppositions we bring to the task. By doing this, we take an added extra measure of caution to ensure we are not bringing foreign or anti-scriptural ideas to the task of theology. Throughout Turretin's prolegomena, the ideas of humility, submission to the authority of the Word, and the desire to worship God are present throughout. It is for these reasons that one scholar can conclude that

"without exaggeration, the theological prolegomena of the seventeenth-century Protestant scholastics provide a model for the development of a distinctively Protestant but nonetheless universally Christian or catholic theology—a model that Protestant theology today can ignore only at great risk." 46

We would be on the fool's errand if we were to read Turretin's prolegomena and treat it as something that is purely theoretical. On the contrary, we should recognize its theoretical nature, but it should also move us to practice—to consider carefully the issues of theological presuppositions in our own theology. This, of course, would, God willing, move us to love and worship God. Soli Deo Gloria!


47Muller, Dogmatics, p. 53; idem, Dictionary, p. 280, q. v. sententia.


50Muller, Dogmatics, p. 64.


56Muller, Dogmatics, p. 73.

57Muller, Dogmatics, p. 55.


60Turretin, Institutes, 1.1.7, p. 2.

61Turretin, Institutes, 1.1.8, p. 2.


63Turretin, Institutes, 1.7.2, p. 20.

64Turretin, Institutes, 1.7.3, p. 20.

65Aquinas, Summa, q. 1, art. 4, pt. 1, p. 3.

66Turretin, Institutes, 1.7.2, p. 21.

67Turretin, Institutes, 1.7.15, p. 23.

68Turretin, Institutes, 1.7.4, p. 21.

69Turretin, Institutes, 1.5.4, p. 16.

70Muller, Dictionary, p. 302, q. v. theologa in se.

71Muller, Dictionary, pp. 300, 304, q.v. theologa beatorum et theologa viatorum.


73Ockham, Questions, 5.3, p. 407.

74Calvin, Institutes (1559 ed.), 1.13.1, p. 121.


76Turretin, Institutes, 1.2.6, p. 4.

77Turretin, Institutes, 1.8, vol. 1, p. 23.

78Turretin, Institutes, 1.8.4, p. 24.

79Turretin, Institutes, 1.8.5, pp. 24-25.

80See Muller, Dogmatics, pp. 243-49.

81Turretin, Institutes, 1.8.8, p. 26.

82Turretin, Institutes, 1.10.3, p. 33.

83Turretin, Institutes, 1.12.9, p. 39.

84Turretin, Institutes, 1.9.12, p. 31.


86Muller, Dogmatics, p. 242.

87Turretin, Institutes, 1.13.2, p. 44.

88Turretin, Institutes, Preface, p. xili.

89Turretin, Institutes, Preface, p. xii-xiii.

90Muller, Dogmatics, p. 73.

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